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Abstract 
The world-scale disaster in the Gulf of Mexico on 20 April 2011 drew the attention of the 
authorities and oil and gas companies to the reliability of the blowout preventer systems. The 
efficiency of emergency preparedness to operate such systems was also in the spotlight due to 
several unsuccessful attempts to operate during the accident. Generally, there are three main 
methods and five sub-methods, which allow controlling the blowout preventer systems when 
the primary control system is not available. All methods have their advantages and 
disadvantages in form of cost, availability and reliability. Some of them are independent; some 
depend either on the blowout preventer configuration and state or on other auxiliary equipment. 
More detailed analysis and investigation of these methods show that there is still a room for 
developing of new solutions technologies for emergency controls. 
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1 Introduction 
The Macondo accident in the Gulf of Mexico demonstrated to the world how easy it was to 
oversee the potential accidents. Accidents happen often because of the vulnerability of safety 
and emergency systems in oil and gas industry. Detailed and expensive analysis could be 
performed on the safety systems to ensure their reliability and to secure redundancy. Systems 
that provide alternative ways to execute different functions could also be deployed at drilling 
facilities. However, as the overall system size becomes bigger, a number of small and 
unforeseen defects rises. 
Semisubmersible drilling rig Deepwater Horizon was used for drilling and completion 
operations on the Macondo well. It had several emergency systems deployed. Some of them 
had high redundancy. Despite that, the result is however catastrophically – several fatalities, 
loss of facility, loss of company reputation and huge environmental damage. Some of these 
small defects with huge consequences were found in the blowout preventer (BOP) system after 
the accident. The time used on the attempts to regain the control over the blowout preventer 
after the accident was enormous long. None of the attempts to function the BOP valves by the 
remotely operated vehicles has met with success. This demonstrates how important the 
alternative ways to function the BOPs are. 
This thesis’s theme was chosen due to author’s high interest in logical controls and relevancy 
to the current problems in offshore industry. This work will take a closer look at the situations 
where the BOPs are inoperable from the host rigs and the different methods they can be 
controlled with. All methods, their description and discussion will be presented in an easy 
readable manner in form of figures and tables.   
2 Method 
This thesis will describe and analyze the two last parts of an accident at an offshore drilling 
facility – total loss of control and post accidental work, specifically emergency operation of a 
BOP. BOP operation methods that will be discussed here are applicable both for the accidents 
and generally for the events where the BOP functions should be activated when the system 
cannot be controlled from the host facility.  
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Tasks to be performed in the current work: 
 Acquire background technical expertise in BOP systems and their controls. 
 Acquire background technical expertise in ROV (Remotely Operated Vehicle) systems 
and their controls. 
 Acquire background information on Macondo well accident and similar accidents, 
where the emergency BOP control was required. 
 Discuss the response and work done to get the control over the BOPs in these accidents.  
 Develop possible methods to control the BOP in emergencies. 
 Discuss and compare different methods systematically. 
 Come up with further recommendations. 
Most information for this work was found on the web, using the search and databases such as 
Google Scholar and One Petro. Standards were provided by the university library, however 
NORSOK standards were free available from the internet. A large input came from the 
interviews with professionals within oil and gas. 
3 Background 
The background of this work is a disaster that happened in Gulf of Mexico in April 2010. Eleven 
people died and a major damage was caused to the environment by the accident at Macondo 
well. The Macondo well blowout began when the drilling crew of the Deepwater Horizon 
(DWH) were in the last stages of the temporary well abandoning. The drilling personnel 
misinterpreted the pressure test results of the well seal integrity at the bottom of the well, 
believing that cement had sealed the hydrocarbon-bearing zone, while it had not. At that time, 
the only physical barrier left against uncontrolled well flow was the blowout preventer [1].  
3.1 Barriers 
We can describe a barrier as something that either prevents an unwanted event to occur or 
reduces the consequences, in case of an event occurrence. An example of a barrier can be 
lashings used to secure the load during transport on a trailer. These lashings prevent the load to 
move or fall from the transporting platform causing damage to itself or surroundings in case of 
hard breaking or quick turn of the trailer. An example of a barrier that reduces the consequences 
of an unwanted event can be a firefighting system. When all barriers that should prevent the 
fire from establishing fails, the firefighting system tries to reduce the consequences of the event 
fire. 
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A bow-tie diagram can usually represent complex barrier systems used in oil and gas industry. 
Unwanted event (incident) is usually placed in the center of the diagram, e.g. Fire/Explosion. 
Events that trigger the unwanted event are on the left side. Consequences from the occurrence 
of the center event are on the right side. Barriers that prevent the incident are placed between 
the triggering events and the center event. Barriers that reduce the consequences of the center 
event are placed between consequences and the center event. 
We can also compare a set of barriers with a Swiss cheese. Holes in the cheese represent faulty 
or “holes” in the safety barriers. In a case where all the holes of the Swiss cheese slices align in 
a line, we get occurrence of an undesired event. Figure 3.1 shows faulty barriers in Deepwater 
Horizon accident. 
 
Figure 3.1 – Barriers Breached at Deepwater Horizon accident.Relationships of Barriers to 
the Critical Factors. 
Figure: BP, Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report 
Barriers in a well are divided in two categories – primary barriers and secondary barriers. The 
only primary barrier in a drilling well is a fluid column of drilling mud. All other barriers 
including the blowout preventer are secondary barriers. Among the eight safety barriers that 
have been breached at Macondo well accident, the BOP that did not seal the well, played its 
last role. 
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In this work, we will concentrate on a BOP as a last safety barrier against blowout, BOP’s 
functions and modes. 
3.2 Blowout preventer 
BOP – equipment (or valve) installed at the wellhead to contain wellbore 
pressure either in the annular space between the casing and the tubulars or 
in an open hole during drilling, completion, testing or workover operations. 
[2] 
BOP stack is as an assembly of several different types of BOPs. In offshore drilling, BOP stack 
is installed on to the wellhead and connected further to topside through a marine/drilling riser. 
Blowout preventer stack is a heavy piece of equipment, which requires a lot of effort and time 
to install or remove. The weight a BOP stack can be over 380 MT and height over 13 m. This 
indicates how massive this equipment is. 
 
Figure 3.2 – Blowout preventer stack 
Figure: Made by author 
Blowout preventer stack consists of two main assemblies – LMRP (Lower Marine Riser 
Package) and lower BOP stack. It can be operated in either normal or emergency modes. The 
main function for all modes is to seal and control the well. Otherwise, it is also used to test the 
well integrity. Securing the well is done by closing one of the BOP stack sealing devices around 
LMRP 
Lower BOP 
stack 
Riser 
Annular preventer 
Control pod 
Intervention panel 
Accumulator bank 
Ram BOPs 
Wellhead 
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an object running through it or sealing the open hole alone. Different closing mechanisms are 
used for this purpose. 
3.2.1 Lower Marine Riser Package 
LMRP is an assembly installed on top of the lower BOP stack. It contains a riser adapter with 
a flex/ball joint; one or two annular preventers; subsea control pods and a hydraulic connector 
mating the riser system to the lower BOP stack. LMRP is designed to provide releasable 
interface between the drilling riser and the blowout preventer in situations that require this type 
of action, e.g. moving of location due to bad weather conditions; pulling the riser for 
maintenance etc.  
Control pods located inside the LMRP act as a trigger system for the components at the LMRP 
and the BOP stack – ram and annular preventers, kill/choke valves, hydraulic connectors. These 
are always installed in pairs to produce redundancy. Lower Marine Riser Package is also an 
accommodation place for subsea hydraulic accumulators, which store hydraulic power required 
by emergency functions, e.g. Emergency Disconnect Sequence system and ROV intervention 
panel. 
3.2.1.1 Annular BOP 
Annular BOP – is a mechanism that can seal almost around any object running through it. When 
activated, a rubber “doughnut” is squeezed to the borehole center. Due to elastomer material, 
the inner diameter of the packer is formed around any object that runs through it to create a 
seal. Annular BOP can also be used to seal the open hole. Typical specifications of annular 
BOPs range from 7-1/16” to 21-1/4” nominal diameter, 2000 - 15000 psi, working pressure [3]. 
This type of closing device is usually located at the top of the BOP stack in LMRP. Two annular 
BOPs – upper and lower, were installed at DWH BOP stack. 
3.2.1.2 Flex joint 
Flex joint is used to compensate for horizontal movements of the drilling unit hence reduce the 
bending moment on the riser. The rotational stiffness of the flex joint is its primary advantage 
in front of ball joints and ranges usually from 13600 Nm to 108800 Nm, depending on the bend 
angle. 
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3.2.2 Lower BOP stack 
Lower stack is an assembly that is installed on to the wellhead, and further connected to the 
riser via Lower Marine Riser Package. Lower BOP stack usually accommodates several sets of 
rams, kill and choke outlets and valves, hydraulic wellhead connector, subsea hydraulic 
accumulators and ROV intervention panel. 
3.2.2.1 Ram BOP 
Ram BOP – is a closing mechanism that uses rams to close the bore or seal around a pipe. There 
are mainly two types of ram BOPs: 
 Pipe Ram / Variable Bore Ram (VBR) – are rams with fixed bore diameters that can seal around 
a specified drilling pipe sizes or narrow range of sizes (Figure 3.3). Several sizes of VBRs are 
usually stacked together to cover a specified range of drilling strings to be used. Typical VBR 
pipe diameter ranges are 2-3/8” x 3-1/2”, 3-1/2” x 5”, 5” x 6-5/8”. 
 
 
a) 
 
 
b) 
Figure 3.3 – VBR seals around a pipe. Same VBR packer seals around different pipe 
diameters: a) Small diameter pipe b) Larger pipe diameter. 
Figure: Shyne Coleman 
 Share Blind Ram (SBR) – are rams that able to cut a tubular1, which runs through a BOP and 
seal the well bore. SBRs differentiate in bore diameter, working pressure and the nominal 
tubular size cutting ability. SBRs are not designed to shear the drill pipe at the tool joint area. 
That is why a precise control of tool joint position is crucial safety ability under drilling 
operations. SBR has two operating modes – high pressure (HP) mode and low pressure (LP) 
                                                 
1 Tubular refers to drill pipe, production tubing, landing string, wire line or coiled tubing. 
Flexible seal 
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mode. LP mode is used when the BOP is operated in normal mode to seal against open hole 
well. HP mode is in use when a tubular have to be sheared, thus in emergency mode. 
Casing Share Ram (CSR) is a subtype of SBR, which is able to cut the large diameter well 
casing. However, CSR does not seal the well. Upper portion of the sheared casing needs then 
to be pulled above the SBR BOP in order to seal the well. 
In 2010, T3 Energy Services introduced a new shear type of ram called Shear All Ram (SAR). 
According to T3 Energy Services, SAR is able to cut through any size and type of casing and 
drilling strings [4]. 
All ram-type preventers are also equipped with locking mechanism that prevents opening of the 
ram unintentionally. These locking mechanisms are usually automatic, and lock the ram in its 
position after the actuation of the ram. There are two main types of locking mechanisms – 
wedge locks and multi-position ram locks. 
A summary of BOP types is outlined in Table 3.1. 
Closing 
device 
Seals around 
tubular 
Seals open 
hole bore 
Shears 
tubular 
Benefits/Drawbacks 
Annular X X  
Seals around any object; Maximum working 
pressure reduces with reduced tubular diameter; 
Commonly closed first under well control 
activities. 
Pipe ram X   Unable to seal open well bore. 
VBR X   
Seals around narrow range of tubular diameters; 
unable to seal open well bore 
SBR  X X 
Cannot shear tool joints or casing; seals the 
well. 
CSR   X Able to shear casings; does not seal the well. 
Table 3.1 – BOP types and their appliance 
NORSOK D-001 6.35.4 specifies the minimum subsea BOP stack configuration as follows [5]: 
 One annular preventer (two for deep water applications [6]); 
 Two shear rams (where at least one is capable of sealing); 
 Two pipe ram preventers; 
All ram BOPs are often placed in a lower BOP stack assembly, while annular preventers are 
part of the Lower Marine Riser Package. 
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3.2.2.2 Choke/Kill and auxiliary lines 
All blowout preventers are supplied with choke and kill line outlets. These are connected with 
topside by means of separate lines running along the drilling riser. Choke/kill lines are used to 
control the pressure in the annular space of the well bore. Heavy, large density, drill mud (kill 
mud) is usually pumped in to the well through a high-pressure kill line in case of a kick to 
balance the well. Choke line is used to bleed off the excess pressure in the annulus either to the 
Mud Gas Separator (MGS) or overboard. Both lines are also used to perform various tests or 
mud circulation activities. Auxiliary lines can comprise mud-boost line2, air-inject lines3 and 
hydraulic supply lines [7]. 
NORSOK D-001 6.35.4 specifies the minimum requirements for choke and kill lines for BOP 
systems [5]: 
 Two choke line outlets; 
 Two kill line outlets; 
 Four kill failsafe close valves; 
 Four choke failsafe close valves. 
DNV OS E101 (pp. 34) [8] specifies following: 
 Choke and kill outlets to be fitted with two fail-safe close valves in series. 
 Shear blind rams to be able to shear the tool joints. If not, lowering and lifting of main 
hoist system to be possible. 
 Pipe rams to be designed for any possible hang off loads. 
 Shear or blind ram BOPs to be fitted with mechanical locks preventing unintended 
opening. 
 LMRP operation should be available from two locations on the rig. Latch and unlatch 
functions should be redundant using two independent mechanisms.  
Figure 3.4 shows an overview of the main components in a BOP system. 
                                                 
2 Mud-boost lines are used to inject drilling fluid just above the BOP stack to increase the drilling fluid, return 
flow velocity in the annular space of the riser. 
3 Air-inject lines are used to supply air for the air-can buoyancy elements along the drilling riser, if such used. 
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Figure 3.4 – Main components of a BOP system 
Figure: Made by author 
3.2.3 BOP Control systems 
All component of a BOP system are hydraulically operated. In order to deliver hydraulic power 
to a correct component under correct pressure, control systems are used. Two main types of 
control systems currently exist – straight hydraulic (Figure 3.5) and multiplex (MUX). Both 
systems are indirect pilot-operated systems. This means that operating a function at the surface 
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does not operate the BOP system directly, but sends pilot signals to the valve, that allows the 
BOP component to receive the hydraulic power. 
 
Figure 3.5 – Simple diagram of a straight hydraulic control system 
Figure: Made by author 
The main difference between these two systems is that straight hydraulic system sends pilot 
hydraulic signals directly from the surface down to the control pods, located at LMRP. MUX 
control system is usually used on deep-water and dynamically positioned drilling rigs, whether 
straight hydraulic system is used on older ones, moored drilling rigs. Multiplex system sends 
coded signals by electronic means from surface to control pods. Control pods in their place 
decode the signal and after verification by reciprocal transmission to the surface, targeted 
solenoid valves are being activated, allowing the hydraulic pilot signal to be send activating the 
desired function4. MUX system makes the pilot signal to travel much shorter way, comparing 
to the straight hydraulic system, where the pilot signal have to travel the whole water depth 
increasing the response time. 
                                                 
4 Operation of kill and choke valves, latching and unlatching the LMRP, opening and closing each set of ram 
preventers, locking and unlocking the rams, opening and closing annular preventers, operation of the control valves 
inside the conduit manifold, setting the pressure regulators etc. 
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Both systems consist of surface and subsea control equipment connected together by lines 
running along the riser. Surface equipment comprises two independent control panels, usually 
located at different locations on the rig – drillers cabin and tool pushers office. A hydraulic 
High Pressure Unit (HPU) together with a hydraulic accumulator bank supplies the needed 
hydraulic power for the control- and BOP systems. Straight hydraulic systems have a pilot 
manifold that controls and sends hydraulic pilot signals to the subsea control pods. In its place, 
an electronic central control unit is used in multiplex control systems. It sends electric signals 
to the subsea mux electronic packages, ref. Figure 3.6. 
 
Figure 3.6 – Simple diagram of a multiplex (MUX) control system 
Figure: Made by author 
As mentioned above, subsea control equipment includes a pair of subsea control pods, that 
based on the pilot signals received from the surface, activate needed functions of the BOP stack 
or LMRP. Subsea accumulators are mounted on either LMRP, lower BOP stack or both. There 
are several reasons for installing subsea accumulators. They can provide additional source of 
independent hydraulic power supply in case of emergency or primary supply failure; reduce 
equipment response time for both pilot and main hydraulic circuits. 
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To increase redundancy of the control system, a pair of dedicated hydraulic lines run from the 
surface to the LMRP. For straight hydraulic system, these lines are umbilicals, usually 
consisting of 1” main hydraulic supply hose in the center, and depending on the number BOP 
functions, number of 3/16” hydraulic hoses around it. Two electric cables follow the riser from 
the cable reels topside to the control pods subsea in MUX control systems. Refer to Table 3.2, 
Figure 3.5 and Figure 3.6 for a clear overview. 
Controls location Straight hydraulic Multiplex 
Topside controls Electric signals are sent from the 
drillers or tool pushers control panels to 
the solenoid valves inside the electric 
junction boxes at the HPU. They supply 
air to pilot valves and pilot regulators 
inside the pilot manifold. Air-activated 
pilot valves provide hydraulic signals to 
the subsea pilot manipulated valves 
(SPM) through an umbilical 
Electric signals are send from the 
drillers or tool pushers control panels to 
the central control unit. Signals are then 
encoded and sent to the subsea control 
pods via a pair of MUX electric cables.  
Subsea controls Hydraulic pilot signals received from 
the surface activate SPMs, allowing the 
hydraulic power from the main line to 
the desired BOP function. 
Subsea control pod decodes the signals 
and activates the targeted solenoid 
valves. It allows the hydraulic pilot 
lines to activate targeted SPMs. When 
SPMs are activated, one of the sides of 
the hydraulic component pressurizes 
and the other vents. 
Surface power 
supply 
HPU supplies the pilot lines with 2000 
psi and the main power supply line with 
3000 psi. 
HPU supplies the pilot lines with 3000 
psi and the main power supply line with 
5000 psi. 
Subsea power 
supply 
Accumulators and ROV intervention 
Table 3.2 – Comparison of two main types of control systems 
3.2.4 BOP Emergency functions 
As the BOP is the last mechanical barrier in the event of blowout, it is loaded with several 
emergency functions. 
3.2.4.1 Emergency Disconnect Sequence 
EDS – Emergency Disconnect Sequence is a programmed sequence of commands sent to the 
control pods from the topside after an EDS button was pushed. Number and type of functions 
included in the sequence differs from the operator to operator. However, it includes some 
fundamental functions. Primary functions of the EDS are to secure the well (closing the shear 
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blind ram) and to disconnect LMRP in case of inability of the rig to maintain its position or 
during other emergencies. Other functions such as close/block of choke and kill lines, retract 
the pod stingers, unlatch choke and kill connections as mentioned above are rig/operator 
dependent. A number of functions of the EDS affects also the total response time of the 
sequence. Normally it varies from 30 to 90 seconds [9]. In BOP systems equipped with 
autoshear system, disconnection of the LMRP can be done prior to activation of the shear blind 
rams. 
3.2.4.2 Autoshear systems 
Autoshear systems are designed to activate and close the shear blind ram in the event of 
disconnect of the LMRP from the lower BOP stack. The hydraulic power is then supplied from 
the local storage – stack mounted accumulators. 
3.2.4.3 Automatic Mode Function (AMF) / Deadman system 
AMF function closes the shear blind ram only if all three conditions are simultaneously 
satisfied: 
1. Loss of electrical supply to the control pods 
2. Loss of hydraulic supply to the control pods 
3. Loss of control signal to the control pods 
3.2.4.4 Automatic disconnect function 
Automatic disconnect function is triggered when the preset riser angle is achieved. This 
function is similar to autoshear system; however, the trigger mechanism is different. 
3.2.4.5 Acoustic control systems 
Acoustic control systems are used as a backup systems to be able to send a number of specified 
commands to the stack mounted control pod in the event when all other communication means 
are absent. Acoustic systems can also be supplied with a dedicated hydraulic accumulator. The 
selected functions such as unlocking of riser connector, activating of shear blind ram and 
closing of middle and upper rams are typically included in the list of emergency functions of 
acoustic control system. 
3.2.4.6 ROV operated functions 
Critical functions, such as shear rams, one pipe ram, ram locks (if applicable) and unlatching 
of the LMRP can be activated with the help of a ROV. Connection between the ROV and the 
BOP stack is usually made through a single ported hotstab-receptacle interface. The hydraulic 
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power supply can be provided by means of the ROV hydraulic system, hydraulic system at the 
BOP stack (stack-mounted accumulators) or by means of the separate hydraulic system at the 
well site. 
A dedicated emergency accumulator system may be used for primary emergency functions such 
as AMF/Deadman or autoshear. In addition, secondary emergency control functions and 
systems may use a dedicated accumulator system, e.g. acoustic systems, ROV intervention 
systems. 
3.3 Remotely Operated Vehicle 
Remotely operated vehicles are divided into several categories according to their capabilities 
and target usage. NORSOK U-102 classifies ROVs into three groups [10], ref. Table 3.3. 
ROV Class Class description 
Class I Pure observation 
Class II Observation with payload option 
Class III Work class vehicles 
Table 3.3 – NORSOK U-101 ROV classes 
Class III vehicles are the biggest type. These vehicles are able to carry large loads of equipment 
(over 200 kg for Class III B) and supply it with power. Class III ROVs has two manipulators in 
front of the vehicle to perform tasks requiring lifting, grabbing, rotation etc. One of these arms 
is called grabber, the other one is working manipulator. NORSOK U-101 specifies the 
minimum requirements for these arms in form of number of functions, outreach and power. 
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Figure 3.7 – XLX 200 equipped with a skid 
Photo: Taken by author 
Usually, manipulators and thrusters are powered by hydraulics. Since the vehicle is equipped 
with one or two HPUs, thrusters and the large amount of the manipulator functions it requires 
valvepacks to be installed. A number of solenoid pilot valves resides inside the valvepacks and 
allow control of each specific function using one power source. Valvepacks are supplied with 
hydraulics from the main HPU and are controlled via electric signals from the ROV control 
rom topside. Work class ROVs are also equipped with an additional valvepack, which can be 
used for auxiliary equipment and tooling, ref Figure 3.8. 
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Figure 3.8 – Simple hydraulic schematic of an work class ROV 
Figure: Made by author 
Compensators are used for hydraulic fluid storage (tank). Compensators provide pressure 
compensation for the water depth gradient, and usually comprise a dynamic reservoir preloaded 
with a spring. The reservoir can also be made of an elastic material such as rubber. Typical 
compensator volumes installed on work class ROVs are in range of 20 liters. To extend the 
hydraulic volume capacity of the ROV “belly” skids can be used. Skids can also be equipped 
with other miscellaneous equipment such as Dirty Work Packs (DWP), valvepacks and payload 
baskets for tools. DWP is a hydraulic motor operated by the ROV hydraulic supply, running a 
hydraulic pump. DWP provides a separate hydraulic circuit using dedicated hydraulic fluid 
storage. This allows the ROV hydraulic fluid to stay clean when using the auxiliary tools or 
stabbing into subsea equipment with a hot stab.  
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4 Three case studies 
4.1 Case 1 - Deepwater Horizon 
Deepwater Horizon accident occurred on 20 April 2010, when the rig was preparing the 
exploration well to temporary abandonment. Due to several factors (e.g. bad well integrity and 
poor well control management), reservoir fluids managed to pass the BOP, enter the riser and 
escape to the rig. Later, hydrocarbons were ignited, what lead to rig sinking and uncontrolled 
blowout subsea. 
4.1.1 BOP system configuration 
The LMRP at Deepwater Horizon included two Cameron 18 ¾”, 10K annular preventers – 
upper and lower [11]. Lower annular has been modified into “stripping” annular preventer. This 
allowed the drill crew to strip the drill pipe while having the lower annular closed. However, 
this change reduced its rated working pressure from 10000 psi to 5000 psi. Four 60-gallon 
hydraulic accumulators were installed on the riser package to compensate for the delay in 
response in control system [12]. These were also used to serve as a backup source of hydraulic 
energy in case of absence of the main hydraulic supply from the surface. The rig operated at 
1500 m water depth on the day of accident. 
Lower BOP stack consisted of upper blind shear rams, lower casing shear rams, followed by a 
set of two variable bore rams and one test ram. All ram BOPs were of Cameron TL type, 18 
3/4" size, rated for 15000 psi working pressure and equipped with ST locks, except of CSR 
[11]. Eight 80-gallon hydraulic accumulator bottles were mounted on the lower BOP stack for 
emergency functions, such as AMF/deadman and autoshear [12]. No acoustic backup control 
system was installed at the stack. 
The main hydraulic supply from the rig had pressure of 5000 psi as it is common for MUX 
control systems. It was regulated down at the control pods. Accumulators were charged up to 
7200 psi. However pressure from these accumulators was also regulated down to 4000 psi [13]. 
4.1.2 BOP system status after accident took place 
After the hydrocarbons have been released to the drilling deck, some rapid well control actions 
were taken. First response was to reroute the blowout to the MGS via the diverter system. 
Second action was to close the upper annular preventer. However, the pressure at the drill pipe 
did not indicate the proper seal, most likely due to already established high flow over it. After 
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that, an attempt was done either to close the VBR or to tighten the AP by regulating its hydraulic 
supply pressure. This action did temporary seal the well, but at this point, high well flow over 
the AP cased erosion in sealing element of the preventer and in the drill pipe. Closing the VBR 
caused the drill pipe pressure to rise, followed by its rapture at the eroded section upstream. 
The released flammable gas exploded on the rig. The crew attempted to run the emergency 
disconnect sequence with no luck. The explosion damaged the MUX cables, leaving the rig 
without control over the BOP [12]. 
The emergency automatic mode function (AMF) was armed prior to accident. However, later 
investigation showed that due to low battery voltage and misswired solenoid valves in the 
control pods, the AMF system could not shut in the well [14]. Later ROV intervention would 
also discover a leak at the hydraulic control circuit of the SBR. Table 4.1 shows the status of 
the different BOP components after the rig sank. 
Component/function Status 
Upper annular preventer Closed; Seal eroded due to high flow. 
Lower annular preventer Open 
Upper shear blind ram Open; 0.1 gpm leak at the ST-lock circuit [12]. 
Lower casing shear ram Open 
Upper variable bore ram Closed; Seal achieved.  
Middle variable bore ram Open 
Lower test ram Open 
Table 4.1 – DWH BOP system status after the rig sank 
4.1.3 Emergency operation 
After the explosion damaged the BOP control cables, and absence of acoustic control system 
installed, ROV intervention was the next step in emergency operation. Using the hotstab 
interface, ROV tried to activate the shear blind ram. No pressure build-up indicated that there 
was a leak in the system. The leak was found at the ST-lock close circuit (Figure 4.1). The 
autoshear rod was then cut by ROV in to simulate the LMRP disconnection. This action did not 
seal the well. The second try was made to activate SBR after the leakage at the ST-lock circuit 
had been fixed. Pressure build up indicated that the SBR had already been closed by cutting the 
autoshear rod. 
Later attempts were made to close the middle pipe ram and annular preventer using the sea 
deployed accumulators with no luck. Several issues emerged including hydraulic system leak 
and incorrect hydraulic plumbing from ROV panel to pipe rams [14]. 
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Figure 4.1 – ROV photo of leaking hose fitting at ST-lock hydraulic 
circuit 
Photo: BP, Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report 
4.2 Case 2 - Diamond Ocean Concord 
Accident at Diamond Ocean Concord drilling rig occurred February 28, 2000 in Gulf of 
Mexico. A subsea engineer was installing protective caps on the BOP control buttons while the 
rig was exposed to the well formations, installing the liner. The engineer successfully installed 
the caps at the drillers control panel. He did not lock out the control panel at the tool pusher’s 
office while he was performing the caps installation and accidently pushed the LMRP unlatch 
button. 
The accidental LMRP unlatch command resulted in the release of the oil-based drilling mud 
column from the riser making the well underbalanced. Underbalanced well begun to flow. The 
BOP, located at 762 m depth [15], did not have any secondary control system, nor a ROV 
intervention panel. 
The crew managed to latch the LMRP on to the lower BOP stack after several attempts, before 
the high velocity well flow has been established. BOP control was gained and the well has been 
secured [16]. 
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4.2.1 BOP system configuration 
The blowout preventer used at the Diamond Ocean Concord rig was comprised of two Shaffer 
21 ¼” annular preventers, having working pressure up to 5000 psi and four Cameron 18 ¾” 
10000 psi ram preventers [17]. As mentioned above, the BOP was not equipped with ROV 
intervention panel that would allow the hotstab operation of the ram preventers. The fact that 
the well was not secured after the LMRP disconnect tells about the absence of the autoshear 
function or that the function was not armed prior drilling operation. 
4.3 Case 3 - Discoverer Enterprise 
While tripping out of the hole, the drilling riser parted apart in two places – right above the 
LMRP and approximately in the middle of the riser column. Discoverer Enterprise rig was 
conducting drilling operations in May 2003 in the Gulf of Mexico. The water depth at the 
location was 1844 m. The immediate ROV survey confirmed the parted riser. At this point, 
drilling rig had no primary control over the BOP. Likely, the automatic mode function (AMF) 
at the BOP did what it was designed to, closing the shear blind rams and sealing the well [18].   
 
a) 
 
b) 
Figure 4.2 – Photo of parted riser 
a) LMRP after the mud release b) Mud plume escaping from the parted riser 
Photo: OCS Report – Fate and Effects of a Spill of Synthetic-Based Drilling Fluid at 
Mississippi Canyon Block 778 
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4.4 Cases summary 
These three cases demonstrate some important things. They show that the problem of loss of 
primary BOP control exists. The consequences of such loss depend on the reliability of the 
emergency functions of the BOP system, such as autoshear and Deadman systems and the 
existence and reliability of the secondary control systems such as acoustic systems etc. They 
show also that clear emergency procedures should be available in such cases. The personnel 
preparedness is crucial in such events to gain control over the situation. 
5 Emergency operation of BOP 
5.1 Definition 
Drilling an offshore well in most cases will require the operation of the blowout preventer by 
the drilling crew. Operation of the BOP during drilling activities is a normal procedure and 
usually follows a kick in attempt to control a well. The well kick can be triggered mainly during 
drill pipe tripping, during drilling or well completion activities. Tripping the drill pipe can cause 
a piston effect (swabbing/surging), reducing the pressure balance in a well. It is also crucial to 
replace the volume of the tripped drill pipe by the mud, in order to keep the hydrostatic balance 
in the well. Using too light mud, hitting an unexpected high-pressure zone etc. can also cause a 
kick. As an example of a well completion activity that can cause a kick, negative integrity test 
of a well can be mentioned. 
If the well control activities fail, kick turns into a blowout. Hydrocarbons then escape the well 
uncontrolled either subsea, topside or at both locations. This can lead to catastrophic 
consequences. The blowout, however, can occur not only due to failed well control, but also 
due to disconnection between the drilling rig and the well e.g. LMRP disconnect (Case 2), riser 
rapture (Case 3) etc. If the mud column in the riser disappears, the underbalanced well will start 
to flow. 
In order to prevent the blowout and reduce the consequences, different emergency systems and 
functions were developed. Some of these functions are fully automatic; some have to be 
activated by the crew. Automatic functions need however to be armed in advance from the 
surface. 
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When the well or BOP control are lost, emergency operation of the BOP is then required either 
by drilling crew or automatics. In case when these actions fail to establish the well control, third 
party intervention becomes necessary. This work will analyze possible methods to operate the 
BOP at the last stage of emergency (ref. Figure 5.1). 
Emergency
Type of 
emergency?
Well control
Regular well control 
activities
Annular preventers
Ram preventers
Disconnect/loss of comunication Control gained?
No
Crew operated 
emergency 
functions
Control gained?
No
Automatic 
emergency 
functions
AMF/Deadman
Autoshear
Auto Disconnect
Well contained?
No
Third party 
intervention
Acoustic control
ROV intervention
Auxilary equipment
Capping stack
EDS
HP SBR
Acoustic 
control
Yes
Well contained
Control gained
Yes Yes
 
Figure 5.1 – Emergency response flow 
Figure: Made by author 
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5.2 BOP emergency operation methods 
When the well cannot be controlled using existing connection between the BOP stack and the 
host facility due to several reasons, there is a number of alternatives. Three main types of control 
methods exist today – acoustic, ROV intervention and use of capping device to gain control of 
the well. Despite the third option is not directly related to controlling the BOP, it is mentioned 
in this work, due to its common task to get the control over the well. 
As stated above, the main task for all methods is to gain control over the well. However, various 
methods, depending on the situation at site will require different amount of time to execute. 
Following seven methods to control the subsea blowout preventer in emergencies will be 
presented in the next section: 
1. Acoustic control method 
2. ROV intervention methods 
a. ROV intervention method A – ROV pump 
b. ROV intervention method B – ROV skid 
c. ROV intervention method C – Subsea deployed line 
d. ROV intervention method D – Seabed deployed accumulators 
e. ROV intervention method E – Other means 
3. Control method using capping stack 
5.2.1 Control method 1 of 3 - Acoustic control 
Acoustic control system provides wireless link between a subsea BOP and surface. It is capable 
to transmit monitor-data from the well such as pressure and temperature, and to control several 
BOP functions. A conventional ACS (acoustic control system) consists of a command unit 
connected to a top transceiver with wire and a pair of fully independent bottom transducers 
connected to a subsea electronic module (SEM), ref Figure 5.2. 
An acoustic command unit is a permanently installed panel on a rig connected to a transceiver 
in the bottom of the rig hull. However, there are also portable command units with transceivers 
available. Acoustic signals sent from surface are received by the transducers subsea at the stack. 
SEM receives acoustic signals from the command unit, decodes them and sends electric signals 
further to the solenoid valves located in the stack-mounted acoustic control pod. Solenoid 
valves then supply hydraulic pilot pressure to the acoustic SPM valves that open for hydraulic 
supply for the targeted BOP function.  
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Figure 5.2 – Acoustic control system 
Figure: Kongsberg Maritime 
For ACS to be considered as an emergency backup system, it has to operate fully independent 
from the primary control system. To do so, it is often supplied with a battery pack for 
electronics. Battery level is continuously transmitted to the surface. ACS uses also its dedicated 
hydraulic accumulator for the pilot signals. It is located inside the acoustic control pod. 
For the operation of the BOP functions by ACS, stack mounted accumulators are used. 
Typically one accumulator is dedicated for the functions triggered by ACS, such as pipe ram 
operation and LMRP connector functions. Though shared, so-called shear accumulator is used 
for SBR or CSR functions. Appendix A illustrates a simple schematic of an ACS with SBR-
close and LMRP-unlatch functions. A typical number of functions operable via ACS is shown 
below in the Table 5.1.  
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 Function Acoustic control system Hydraulic power source 
L
M
R
P
 LMRP connector unlatch X Acoustic accumulator 
Upper annular preventer close   
Lower annular preventer close   
L
o
w
er
 s
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ck
 
Upper shear ram close X Acoustic + shear accumulator 
Lower shear/casing ram close X Acoustic + shear accumulator 
Upper pipe ram close X Acoustic accumulator 
Middle pipe ram close X Acoustic accumulator 
Lower pipe ram close X Acoustic accumulator 
Wellhead connector unlatch   
Arm/Disarm ACS X Acoustic pod accumulator 
Arm/Disarm AMF/Deadman   
Table 5.1 – Typical functions operated via acoustic control system 
API Specification 16 D 5.8.2.2 states that the required acoustic accumulator functional volume 
shall not be less than the volume needed to operate all of ACS functions. [9] 
In the absence of the primary ability to control the BOP, acoustic is the first emergency system 
to be activated to attempt gaining control over the BOP. It can be used almost immediately after 
the emergency initiation. Even if the host facility is unavailable, ACS commands can be sent 
from the portable command unit, located at the helicopter, supply vessel or a lifeboat. A dunking 
transceiver is then has to be submerged into the water to send the acoustic signals. Most recent 
ACS can operate in water depths up to 4000 meters. However, a special technical training is 
required to adjust the acoustic system for different water depths to optimize the link between 
transceivers and hydrophones. Depending on the system and subsea transducers configuration, 
noise from the blowing well mud plumes could affect the capability of acoustic system to 
communicate. Large debris pieces could also be a hindrance for the acoustic signals to reach 
the targeted transducers installed on the BOP stack. 
5.2.2 Control method 2 of 3 - ROV intervention 
A presence of one observation (Class I) and one work-class (Class III) ROV onboard the drilling 
vessel is a good practice offshore. Observation ROV is usually used to monitor subsea activities 
and for general observation and checking. Observation ROV cannot perform physical actions 
in comparison to work-class ROV. Work-class ROV, in its place, is used to install and retrieve 
gaskets between wellhead and lower BOP stack and between lower BOP stack and LMRP. It is 
also used for other tasks when needed.  
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Second alternative to the acoustic control method is then ROV intervention. ROV intervention 
is a very common task nowadays. The possibilities of an ROV in BOP operation is much wider 
and flexible compared to acoustic control when it comes to hydraulic power source. Among 
emergency functions, Table 5.2 shows the most typical that are available for ROV intervention. 
 Function ROV intervention Hydraulic power source 
L
M
R
P
 
LMRP connector unlatch X ROV Hotstab 
Upper annular preventer close   
Lower annular preventer close   
LMRP accumulator charge X ROV Hotstab 
L
o
w
er
 s
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ck
 
Upper shear ram close X ROV Hotstab/shear accumulator5 
Lower shear/casing ram close X ROV Hotstab 
Upper pipe ram close X ROV Hotstab 
Middle pipe ram close X ROV Hotstab 
Lower pipe ram close X ROV Hotstab 
Wellhead connector unlatch X ROV Hotstab 
Arm/Disarm ACS   
Arm/Disarm AMF/Deadman X ROV Hotstab 
Acoustic accumulator charge   
Shear accumulator charge X ROV Hotstab 
Table 5.2 – Typical emergency functions available for ROV 
Since most of the BOP functions operated by ROV intervention are done using the hotstab, the 
source of hydraulic power is only the matter of equipment connected to the hotstab. However, 
there are several limitations for using the ROV. It takes time to deploy a ROV, and time taken 
depends on the presence of the ROV onboard or presence of a supply vessel nearby with a 
proper ROV onboard. Deploy time depends also on the water depth the ROV will be lowered 
to. Availability of auxiliary equipment for ROV intervention is also a factor that can increase 
the time required to deploy a ROV. A major issue draining time can be a presence of debris 
around the BOP, which prevents the ROV access. The debris has to be cleared in order to give 
a minimum access for the ROV to the BOP stack. 
                                                 
5 Closing of upper shear ram by ROV intervention can be done either by hotstab operation or by triggering one of 
the primary emergency functions, e.g. autoshear, AMF. 
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Figure 5.3 – Single port API 17H hotstab and receptacle 
Photo: SECC Oil & Gas 
Weather and environmental conditions such as high current velocities and rough sea states can 
affect the possibility of ROV intervention. The typical ROV launch and recovery systems 
(LARS) can perform in up to sea state five6. Deployment of a ROV in to the rough sea produces 
the risk of damaging the equipment, when lowering it through the splash zone. However there 
are solutions for heavy weather deployment that are able to launch and recover ROVs in sea 
sate six environment7 by using the guide -wires or -rails and optionally protective structure 
around the ROV and tether management system (TMS).  
When it comes to operation of specific BOP functions through a hotstab, ROV will have to be 
able to supply enough flow and pressure by its own means or using some sort of auxiliary 
equipment. A total response time is very important in cases with a blowing well. A flowing 
well has to be contained as fast as possible to avoid the high well flow damaging the BOP. 
Closing the rams or annular preventers has to be done very rapidly to avoid damage to the seals 
by the well flow. The minimum function response times are specified by several standards and 
are shown in Table 5.3. 
                                                 
6 Sea states characterize the wind sea using the codes. Here, sea state 5 defines the significant wave height 
interval of 2.5 to 4 m 19. Wikipedia. Sea state.  [cited 2015 28.04]; Available from: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sea_state.. 
7 Sea state five – significant wave heights of 4 to 6 m. 
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Referencing document Response time 
API Std. 53 (7.3.10.4) [20] 
Annular: less than 60 s. 
Rams: less than 45 s. 
LMRP unlatch: less than 45 s. 
C/K valve: Ram times 
API Spec 16D (5.2.1) [9] 
Annular: less than 60 s. 
Rams: less than 45 s. 
LMRP unlatch: less than 45 s. 
C/K valve: Ram times 
NORSOK D-001 (6.42.1) [5] Refers to API Spec 16D 
Table 5.3 – Response time requirements 
18 ¾” 15K Shaffer BOP using the discrete hydraulic control system will be used to illustrate 
typical volumes and pressures required to operate different functions on the BOP stack, ref. 
Table 5.4.  
 Function Pressure [PSI] Volume [gallon] 
L
M
R
P
 
LMRP connector unlatch 1500 5.16 
Upper annular preventer close 1500 66.16 
Lower annular preventer close 1500 66.16 
LMRP accumulator charge 5000 53.37 (usable volume: 38.12) 
L
o
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ck
 
Upper shear ram close 1500 33.00 
Upper shear ram HP close 3000 33.00 
Lower shear/casing ram close 1500 37.70 
Lower shear/casing ram HP close 3000 37.70 
Upper pipe ram close 1500 16.80 
Middle pipe ram close 1500 16.80 
Lower pipe ram close 1500 16.80 
Wellhead connector unlatch 1500 5.16 
Acoustic accumulator charge 5000 67.25 (usable volume: 48.03) 
Shear accumulator charge 5000 77.87 (usable volume: 77.87) 
Table 5.4 – Shaffer BOP pressures and volumes 
The different ROV intervention methods are discussed further. 
5.2.2.1 ROV intervention method A - ROV Pump 
A most common work class ROVs used on drilling and support vessels are equipped with 
pumps capable to deliver 210 bar at around 50 l/min. However, some ROVs are equipped with 
so-called API Std 53 systems, that are equipped with more powerful hydraulic power units. 
These are capable to supply higher pressures at higher flows. Oceaneering has some types of 
these ROVs. Ref. Table 5.5. 
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Manufacturer Model name 
Max pump 
pressure [bar] 
Max pump flow 
rate [l/min] 
Effect [kW] 
Kystdesign 
Supporter 210 75 26.1 
Installer 210 75 26.1 
IKM Subsea 
Sub Atlantic 
Comanche 
210 28 13.4 
Merlin WR200 
315 49-80 18-30 
250 20-49 8-18 
Oceaneering 
Millennium Ultra8 API Std 53   
Millennium Plus 325 151.4 82 
Magnum Plus 400 94.6 63 
Maxximum 
400 151.5 101 
306 197 101 
Schilling 
Robotics 
HD ROV 207 70 24.1 
UHD III ROV9 
345 189 
109 
172 284 
Table 5.5 – Typical ROV HPU capabilities10 
Using the ROV HPU to operate BOP functions in emergencies will lead to two main problems. 
The first problem is the power of the HPU; the second is the available hydraulic fluid at the 
ROV reservoir.  
Pressures and flows supplied by the ROV pump system depend on the HPU power. Simplified, 
we can say that these parameters follow equation (5.1). 
 𝐸 = 𝑃 ∗ ?̇? (5.1) 
Where 𝐸 is power of the HPU; 𝑃 is pressure delivered; ?̇? is flow delivered. 
Capabilities to operate the Shaffer BOP functions by the ROV types outlined in Table 5.5 are 
showed in Table 5.6 and Table 5.7. 
                                                 
8 Manufacturer datasheet specifies that the ROV type fulfill the API Standard 53 requirements. 
9 Schilling UHD III is equipped with 100+ gallon fluid reservoir onboard 
10 The data was obtained from the manufacturers web sites. 
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Manufacturer Model name LMRP unlatch 
LMRP accumulator 
charge 
Kystdesign 
Supporter X  
Installer X  
IKM Subsea 
Sub Atlantic Comanche X  
Merlin WR200 X  
Oceaneering 
Millennium Ultra X X 
Millennium Plus X  
Magnum Plus X X 
Maxximum X X 
Schilling Robotics 
HD ROV X  
UHD III ROV X X 
Table 5.6 – Capability to operate LMRP functions by different ROV types 
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Kystdesign 
Supporter      X  
Installer      X  
IKM Subsea 
 
Sub Atlantic Comanche      X  
Merlin WR200      X  
Oceaneering 
Millennium Ultra X X X X X X X 
Millennium Plus     X X  
Magnum Plus     X X X 
Maxximum X X X X X X X 
Schilling Robotics 
HD ROV      X  
UHD III ROV X X X X X X X 
Table 5.7 – Capability to operate lower stack functions by different ROV types 
Table 5.6 and Table 5.7 show clearly that only chosen ROV types are able to operate the most 
crucial BOP emergency functions such as blind/casing shear rams and their high-pressure 
function directly. The inability to do so is often due to either low flow rate or pressure supplied 
                                                 
11 Charge of BOP accumulators assume enough hydraulic fluid volume onboard ROV or ability to pump seawater 
directly. 
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by the ROV. Additional factors such as system pressure drop, possible leakages will play its 
role in the ability to operate the desired BOP functions. 
Despite the power of the HPU on the ROV could be enough to operate the BOP functions, the 
need of large volumes of hydraulic fluid to operate these functions faces the second problem 
discussed above – fluid volume available at the ROV. The BOP hydraulic systems are usually 
open-circuit systems, meaning that the operational fluid is vented to the environment after the 
function is executed. That means that the ROV pumping system will need the whole fluid 
volume required by the BOP function available onboard. The normal compensator (reservoir) 
volume installed on work-class ROVs is between 16 and 20 liter. In worse case, seawater can 
be pumped directly into the BOP control system instead of hydraulic fluid. This is not the 
optimal solution due to corrosive properties of the seawater and absence of lubrication. 
Schilling ROVs have this function. 
These two factors make it nearly impossible to use ROV pump system to emergency operate 
BOP functions. Suitable ROVs are not always available onboard the drilling vessel or support 
vessels in the area, and it will take time to mobilize one from the shore. Perhaps price for the 
ROVs capable to operate emergency BOP functions is a step higher than normal work-class 
ROVs. 
5.2.2.2 ROV intervention method B - ROV Skid 
To boost up ROV capabilities, many different add-ons called skids have been developed. A 
skid is typically a construction, which is fixed at the underside of the ROV and matches its 
footprint (Figure 5.4). 
 
Figure 5.4 – BOP intervention skid 
Photo: Oceaneering 
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Skids are loaded with auxiliary equipment that ROV can use under its mission, powering it with 
the ROV pump or/and electricity system. Skids used for BOP intervention are usually 
comprised of a hydraulic fluid bank and a set of high pressure/high flow pumps that are able to 
deliver required power to the BOP. Skid hydraulics make it possible to convert the ROV HPU 
output to have either higher flow or pressure. The total amount of output energy is preserved, 
minus the effect loss after conversion, unless skids get additional power via electric system of 
the ROV. Typical output possibilities are around 345 bar (5000 psi) pressure and 300 l/min (67 
gpm) flow rate. 
As already mentioned, skids usually carry hydraulic storage with them. Typical volume of the 
fluid reservoir, if placed in the skid, is around 400 liter (106 gallon). 
ROV skid is a low cost boost for ROVs functionality. Skids are usually easy installable and 
ready to use after only few connections up to the host system of the vehicle. The size and weight 
of the skid make it flexible addition that could be used in emergencies. 
5.2.2.3 ROV intervention method C - Subsea deployed line 
An alternative to powerful ROV, carrying the skid with the hydraulic fluid is the sea-deployed 
hydraulic line. The line can be a coiled tubing or a reinforced hose. Hydraulic fluid is then 
supplied from the vessel on the surface through this line subsea having high enough flow and 
pressure. A ROV can then, by means of a jumper hose, connect the subsea-deployed line to the 
desired hotstab located at the BOP intervention panel. This method eliminates the power 
requirements of the ROV. 
Time to deploy the subsea line will vary and depend on the availability of the coiled tubing reel 
equipment, hydraulic fluid and pumping equipment onboard of nearby vessels or onshore. 
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5.2.2.4 ROV intervention method D - Seabed deployed accumulators 
 
Figure 5.5 – Oceaneering Subsea Accumulator System 
Photo: Oceaneering 
Another method to secure a successful BOP intervention is to deploy a reserve accumulator 
bank to the seabed, which can then provide hydraulic power to function the BOP, see Figure 
5.5. The accumulator bank needs to be gas pre-charged on the surface prior to deploying it. 
Nitrogen is usually used for this purpose. Gas charging pressure depends on the water depth, 
where the accumulators will be used. 
Accumulators can be charged with hydraulic fluid at the surface, however due to seawater 
pressure gradient, the usable fluid volume is reduced dramatically, increasing size and weight 
of the accumulator bank. That is why, using smaller accumulator systems and charging them 
with hydraulic fluid subsea is often done. See Appendix C – Example of the water depth effect 
on the usable accumulator fluid volumefor a simple example on this matter. 
The usage of this method depends however on availability of the ROV. Special procedures for 
gas charging are required, taking into account the factors such as changes in gas density due to 
temperature difference and the cooling effect caused by the rapid discharge. 
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5.2.2.5 ROV intervention method E - Other means 
This method is based on use of residual power stored in the BOP accumulators. There is a 
possibility that not all of the accumulator fluid volume was used during the first stages of 
attempting to gain control over the well, and there is pressurized control fluid still available. 
This power can then theoretically be used for operation of BOP functions. Depending of the 
available fluid volume and pressure in the accumulators and the ROV intervention panel 
capabilities, different functions can be triggered.  
BOP actuators can be run by operating the corresponding valves on the ROV intervention panel, 
if such are available, see Figure 5.6. An attempt to trigger the autoshear function can be done 
by simulating the LMRP disconnect, cutting the so-called “autoshear” rod. However, one have 
first to ensure that the emergency function is armed. Arming the Deadman system can allow 
the residual hydraulic power to function the shear blind rams in the BOP. 
 
Figure 5.6 – ROV intervention panel 
Figure: Made by author 
In a case where the ROV is not capable to deliver the minimal flow rate to operate the BOP 
safely, but is capable of delivering the required pressure, an option is available. However, this 
is possible only if the accumulator bank can be isolated from the main control system. Charging 
the accumulators does not require high flow rates and can be done by the ROV having low flow 
rate. The charged accumulators can then supply the required flow rate and pressure to the 
targeted functions. 
Manometers 
ROV manipulated 
valves 
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5.2.3 Control method 3 of 3 - Capping stack 
Capping stack is a device very similar to a BOP. It is used to contain the blowing well. It can 
either seal it or direct the hydrocarbons to a floating storage vessel. 
The capping stack consists of a wellhead connector in the bottom that is used to connect and 
obtain a seal between either a wellhead, a top of the BOP or LMRP. Two or more ram type 
BOP valves are placed on to the connector with a mandrel on top of them. Choke and kill outlets 
are connected below the BOP valves. A typical configuration consists of two kill lines having 
two gate valves each, and two choke lines with gate valves and retrievable chokes. All the 
functions are operated through the ROV intervention panel hydraulically or mechanically using 
the standard torque tool. Operational fluid is supplied by the seabed deployed accumulator 
bank.  
 
Figure 5.7 – ROV intervention on the capping stack 
Image: Subsea Well Response Project 
In the event of emergency, the capping equipment is transported offshore to the site. The weight 
of the stack can be 50-100 MT, implying the transportation difficulties. When on site, using the 
special running tool allowing the well flow to penetrate, the capping stack is lowered over the 
blowing BOP or wellhead. Choke and kill lines are then opened and the blind rams are closed, 
following by closing of the kill lines and “soft-shutting” the well using the choke lines. 
Chemical injection, pressure and temperature transition are often features that are included in 
the capping equipment. Figure 5.7 illustrates the ROV intervention of the capping stack 
installed on a BOP. The stack is connected to the seabed deployed accumulator bank using 
flying lead. 
Capping stack 
Blowing BOP 
Subsea deployed 
accumulators 
ROV intervening 
capping stack 
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Special studies and analyses are required prior to deploying the capping stack to avoid hydrate 
forming inside the stack. ROV intervention has to examine the BOP for the possibilities to 
connect the capping stack and not least for possible debris that could prevent the deployment. 
5.3 Methods summary 
Several BOP control methods were discussed so far. All methods have their advantages and 
disadvantages in form of different factors. Table 5.8, outlines a comparison of operation 
methods discussed in this work by using following factors: 
Availability and response time – availability of the equipment at site or in the world, and its 
response time in form of time the emergency occurred until the well is contained. 
Weather dependency – if the deploying of emergency equipment requires the special weather 
conditions. 
Capability – capability of the method to operate the crucial functions leading to well securing. 
Standalone system – independence of the system / method from other auxiliary equipment. 
Affected by the well flow – operability of the method under the presence of the oil/gas plume. 
Cost efficiency – indicator of the total cost for deploying the emergency equipment against the 
methods response time and method capability. 
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Issue 
Method 1 
Acoustic control 
Method 2A 
ROV intervention 
ROV pump 
Method 2B 
ROV intervention 
ROV skid 
Method 2C 
ROV intervention 
Deployed line 
Method 2D 
ROV intervention 
Deployed 
accumulators 
Method 2E 
ROV intervention 
Residual BOP 
power 
Method 3 
Capping stack 
Availability and response time Very short response 
times, however, 
usually not available 
on the drilling rigs. 
Obligatory in North 
sea. 
Good response 
times. Available on 
most drilling vessels 
and installations. 
Good response 
times. Time skid 
mounting and 
function test 
required. Usually not 
available onboard – 
need to be shipped. 
Available onshore. 
Intermediate 
response times. 
Special equipment is 
required. Not 
available onboard. 
Easy to acquire 
onshore. 
Long response times 
due to charging 
requirement and 
transportation. 
Available onshore. 
Good to 
intermediate 
response times. 
Depends on residual 
hydraulic power in 
the accumulators. 
Long response 
times. Available 
only few places in 
the world. 
Weather dependent No Yes. Requires calm sea. Normal operating sea is Hs < 4 m. Yes due to heavy 
lifting and 
deploying. 
Emergency operation 
capability 
Yes Generally not 
capable. Few ROV 
types available that 
are capable to 
operate the BOP 
directly. 
Yes, if ROV is able 
to supply required 
power for the skid, 
either hydraulically 
or electrically. 
Yes Yes Unknown. Depends 
on remained 
pressure and volume 
in stack 
accumulators. 
Yes, if charging the 
accumulators by 
ROV intervention. 
Yes 
Standalone system No, uses the control 
pods on MUX 
systems. Relies on 
shared accumulator. 
 
Yes, if supplied 
with dedicated 
accumulator bank. 
Yes No, depends on 
ROV power. 
No depends on ROV intervention. No, relies on 
residual power in the 
stack accumulators 
and their operability. 
Yes 
Affected by the well flow Yes, can be affected 
by the flow noise. 
Yes, can be affected. Requires special equipment for navigating in low vision environment. Yes, requires special 
assessment to avoid 
hydrate formation. 
Cost efficiency Very high High Middle Low Low High Very low 
Table 5.8 – BOP emergency operation methods comparison
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6 Discussion 
When an emergency occurs at offshore drilling facility, where the primary control over the BOP 
is lost, minutes count. The immediate decision-making and response are crucial. The 
preparedness of the drilling companies varies a lot. It depends often on the location they operate, 
due to differences in authority’s demands. This work gave an overview over seven different 
methods to gain control over a BOP in such cases. As mentioned above, the main issue is the 
absence of the primary control over the BOP that can be in form of malfunction of the control 
system, unintended disconnect of the facility or a total disaster like in Deepwater Horizon 
accident. Each of these methods is unique in its way and suits best for each individual case. 
However, some of them could be a “good practice” to have in disposition under drilling 
operations. 
6.1 Acoustic systems 
One of those is acoustic control system. The major weaknesses with this system are unreliable 
communication in presence of noise subsea and possible inability to communicate through 
obstacles such as debris. Most of acoustic control panels nowadays provide the status of the 
system in form of battery voltage for subsea pods, pressure level and function read-backs, which 
makes it easy to decide if the system is usable at a moment of emergency. The operation of 
acoustic system is weather independent, comparing to other methods that require conditional 
weather to be deployed. The response times of the acoustic systems are incomparable short. 
If the system development achieves high enough reliability, it should be obligatory to have 
installed on every BOP and drilling vessel or installation.  
6.2 ROV interventions 
ROV intervention is necessary in all the other methods either for operating the BOP or as a 
support for other equipment. Successful ROV intervention relies on an acceptable weather 
conditions for deploying the vessel in the first place. Another challenge is the presence of strong 
underwater current that could affect the usefulness of ROVs having weak thruster power. Low 
visibility conditions due to mud or oil plume makes it nearly impossible to operate without 
special equipment. Ultrasound sonars solves the problem of low visibility. Sending the sound 
waves in front of the ROV and receiving the reflected waves from the obstacles creates a two 
dimensional image based on the wave arriving time delay, see Figure 6.1. 
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Figure 6.1 – Sonar versus camera in low visibility condition 
Photo: Youtube video frame. URL: www.youtube.com/watch?v=CULhKenlqOs 
6.2.1 ROV pump system 
As it can be seen from the Table 5.6 and Table 5.7, only several ROV types are capable of 
providing enough hydraulic power to operate the BOP rams. However, the ROV alone can be 
used in first place for inspection and triggering the BOP functions, which do not require high 
flow rates, and pressures, e.g. LMRP disconnect. 
ROV alone is used to perform the subsea operations allowing the other equipment to do its job. 
Connecting the jumper hoses, operating valves, assisting in debris clearance12 and general 
observation are the main purpose of ROV intervention. 
6.2.2 ROV assisted emergency equipment 
The ROV skid solution is only applicable for the ROV types that have powerful enough HPU 
to achieve the full effect of these skids. The largest advantage of these skids is their fluid storage 
capacity that can be used for charging accumulators on either the BOP stack or the sea-deployed 
accumulator banks. Equipment such as ROV skids, accumulator banks and subsea deployed 
“hotline” uses the deck space and provides additional weight for the vessels bearing it. Storing 
this equipment on the drilling vessel or installations is not useful in cases where the facility has 
to be evacuated and abandoned. However, it should be available onshore in strategic locations 
                                                 
12 Debris clearance will require the special tools for parting the debris. Oceaneering provide most of tools needed 
in their Subsea Emergency Response Toolbox. 
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to make the emergency response fast. The emergency response equipment should be stored in 
packages containing several different equipment types available at same location. The choice 
of the equipment package should be made and prioritized according to the needs at the accident 
site. E.g., package for debris clearing, package for subsea deployed accumulators etc. 
6.3 Capping stack method 
Capping stack can be used as an alternative or as an addition to the emergency response method. 
It does not operate the BOP directly, but extending the current one, with operable part. Due to 
its large dimensions and weight the decision of using the capping stack is difficult. Despite the 
involvement of heavy transport, several support and ROV vessels, the use of capping stack is 
perhaps the most reliable method.  Currently capping stack packages are contingency stored in 
strategic places all around the world. 
6.4 Discussion summary 
The next table shows evaluation of the methods discussed in this work. 
Method Evaluation 
1. Acoustic 
control 
ACS is the only wireless control method. Its operation is independent of other 
control elements. However, the BOP operation via ACS relies on the stack 
mounted accumulator power. Further development of the technology with focus on 
the communication reliability is required. 
2a. ROV pump Special ROV types required to operate a blowing BOP safely without damaging 
the seals. Regular work class ROV will most likely fail in operating the BOP 
functions directly using its own hydraulic pump system. Failed attempts can also 
damage the BOP sealing elements. 
2b. ROV skid Skids have a large potential. If supplied with enough power, these can located 
onboard drilling vessels and ROV support vessels in the area, on a regular basis.  
2c. Sea-deployed 
line 
This method can probably replace the seabed-deployed accumulators in shallow 
areas. Deep waters will create large loads on the line due to its own weight. 
Weather will influence the usability of this method. 
2d. Seabed 
deployed 
accumulators 
Time-consuming method. Seabed-deployed accumulators will probably be useful 
in cases when the stack-mounted accumulators are discharged. Accumulator 
discharge should not have occurred due to BOP operation, but due to a leak in the 
system or other reasons. This means that BOP closing devices were not operated 
prior to intervention using the seabed-deployed accumulators. 
2e. Residual BOP 
power 
An attempt to control the BOP using its own power shall be made. However, one 
must ensure that there is enough accumulator pressure / volume to close the BOP 
device safely. This method can be safely used in attempts to unlatch the 
LMRP/wellhead or to arm different BOP emergency functions (AMF, Autoshear). 
3. Capping stack The most time consuming and expensive method. This is probably the last method 
to be used, after all other methods failed. Capping stack allows for further work on 
the well after its installation – rerouting the well flow to a floating storage vessel, 
kill the well using the kill lines at the stack. 
Table 6.1 – Emergency operation methods summary 
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6.5 Further recommendations 
6.5.1 BOP status indicators 
BOPs could be equipped with the visual indicators or logging devices for valves status (rams, 
ram locks, choke and kill valves etc.) and pressure/volume status of the accumulators. This 
information acquired by the ROV inspection could be useful in decision-making and choice of 
the control method. 
6.5.2 Accumulator isolation valves 
ROV intervention panels can be fitted with an accumulator isolation valve. The valve will 
isolate the accumulators from the control system, so that they can be charged using the low flow 
rated ROV pumps. After the charging is complete, high flow capacity of the accumulators can 
then be used to trigger the BOP functions such as shear blind rams. 
6.5.3 Divide accumulator banks in groups  
Dividing accumulator batteries in groups will reduce the risk of whole accumulator bank 
discharge in case of a leakage. This can be done by use of sequence and check valves. The 
accumulators will then discharge sequentially one by one. When the first group pressure falls 
below the set value, the flow from the next group of accumulators will then be opened. It will 
however require separate lines from each accumulator group to the targeted function of the 
equipment, ref. Appendix D. 
6.5.4 Standard acoustic control protocol 
The command units can be provided to most of the vessels, supporting drilling facilities. This 
will allow each individual BOP to be controlled from not only the host facility but also the 
surrounding vessels in case of emergency. Providing address and passphrase to the subsea 
control units upon the engaging the control can be a security measure to employ. 
Implementation of unified acoustic control protocol will require some level of standardization. 
This measure will reduce the total amount of accidents. 
6.6 Conclusion 
This work gave an insight into the problems and challenges associated with the emergency 
operation of subsea blowout preventers. Among the chosen methods, this work looked at five 
of seven methods, which require remote operated vehicle intervention to operate. ROV skids 
require ROV power. Subsea deployed accumulators and lines together with capping stack need 
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to be connected to the ROVs and to be operated by them. ROV will most likely fail to operate 
the BOP on its own. Usage of auxiliary equipment such as intervention skids or seabed-
deployed accumulators require time and good weather conditions. Acoustic control is the only 
wireless method that allows very fast response. However, acoustic control systems have their 
drawbacks in form of communication reliability. This leads to the fact that remote and wireless 
BOP operation technologies, such as acoustic needs to be developed to avoid the ROV 
intervention.  
To strengthen the other methods, ROV power capabilities should be extended, allowing to 
provide more power to the equipment, to lift heavier parts, to move in rougher seas and navigate 
in low to zero visibility conditions. 
The key in emergency preparedness is to have clear plans and procedures for main types of 
scenarios, reliable and tested contingency equipment and personnel training in such scenarios. 
Deepwater Horizon accident was the triggering event on the way to achieve the wanted level 
of safety and reliability of the BOP systems and their secondary and alternative ways to operate 
them. 
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Appendix A - Simple hydraulic schematic of an ACS 
Simple hydraulic schematic of an ACS comprising SBR close and LMRP unlatch functions. 
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Appendix B – Power required to run BOP functions 
Power required by the functions of the Shaffer BOP used as an example in the thesis. 
 
  
Power required to run BOP functions
By Kiryl Kozel
23/04/2015
Page 1 of 3
LMRP Unlatch
Required pressure: ≔P 1500 psi
Required volume: ≔v 5.16 gal
Maximum response time: ≔t 45 s
Required flow: ≔V =―v
t
6.88 gpm
Required power: ≔E =⋅P V 4.489 kW
Upper/Lower Annular close
Required pressure: ≔P 1500 psi
Required volume: ≔v 66.16 gal
Maximum response time: ≔t 60 s
Required flow: ≔V =―v
t
66.16 gpm
Required power: ≔E =⋅P V 43.169 kW
Upper Shear Ram close
Required pressure: ≔P 1500 psi
Required volume: ≔v 33 gal
Maximum response time: ≔t 45 s
Required flow: ≔V =―v
t
44 gpm
Required power: ≔E =⋅P V 28.709 kW
Upper Shear Ram HP close
Required pressure: ≔P 3000 psi
Required volume: ≔v =33 gal 124.919 L
Maximum response time: ≔t 45 s
Required flow: ≔V =―v
t
44 gpm
Required power: ≔E =⋅P V 57.419 kW
Power required to run BOP functions
By Kiryl Kozel
23/04/2015
Page 2 of 3
Lower Shear/Casing Ram close
Required pressure: ≔P 1500 psi
Required volume: ≔v 37.7 gal
Maximum response time: ≔t 45 s
Required flow: ≔V =―v
t
50.267 gpm
Required power: ≔E =⋅P V 32.798 kW
Lower Shear/Casing Ram HP close
Required pressure: ≔P 3000 psi
Required volume: ≔v 37.7 gal
Maximum response time: ≔t 45 s
Required flow: ≔V =―v
t
50.267 gpm
Required power: ≔E =⋅P V 65.597 kW
Upper/Middle/Lower Pipe Ram close
Required pressure: ≔P 1500 psi
Required volume: ≔v 16.8 gal
Maximum response time: ≔t 45 s
Required flow: ≔V =―v
t
22.4 gpm
Required power: ≔E =⋅P V 14.616 kW
Wellehad connector unlatch
Required pressure: ≔P 1500 psi
Required volume: ≔v 5.16 gal
Maximum response time: ≔t 45 s
Required flow: ≔V =―v
t
6.88 gpm
Required power: ≔E =⋅P V 4.489 kW
Power required to run BOP functions
By Kiryl Kozel
23/04/2015
Page 3 of 3
LMRP accumulator charge
Required pressure: ≔P 5000 psi
Required volume: ≔v 53.37 gal
Accoustic accumulator charge
Required pressure: ≔P 5000 psi
Required volume: ≔v 67.25 gal
Shear accumulator charge
Required pressure: ≔P 5000 psi
Required volume: ≔v 77.87 gal
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Appendix C – Example of the water depth effect on the 
usable accumulator fluid volume 
Example showing how water depth affect the usable accumulator hydraulic fluid volume if 
charged subsea compared to surface. 
 
  
Accumulator usable volume comparison calculation
By Kiryl Kozel
24/04/2015
Page 1 of 2
Conditions:
0 - Precharge
1 - Charged
2 - MOP (Pressure limited)
3 - Total discharge (Volume limited)
Enviroment data:
Water density: ≔ρw 8.54 ――
lb
gal
Water depth: ≔d ⎛⎝ ⋅4 103 ⎞⎠ ft
Hydrostatic head pressure: ≔Ph =⋅⋅d g ρw ⎛⎝ ⋅1.77 10
3 ⎞
⎠ psi
Accumulator and functions data:
Accumulator bottle pressure rating: ≔Pmax ⎛⎝ ⋅7 10
3 ⎞
⎠ psi
Accumulator bottle volume: ≔V0 15 gal
Pressure required by the function: ≔Pf ⎛⎝ ⋅3 10
3 ⎞
⎠ psi
Accumulator charge calculation:
Gas precharge pressure at surface: ≔Pca ⎛⎝ ⋅3 10
3 ⎞
⎠ psi
Gas precharge pressure subsea: ≔Pcb ⎛⎝ ⋅4.755 10
3 ⎞⎠ psi
Gas pressure subsea for surface charged 
accumulator:
≔P0a =−Pmax Ph
⎛
⎝ ⋅5.23 10
3 ⎞
⎠ psi
Gas pressure subsea for subsea charged 
accumulator: ≔P0b =−Pcb Ph ⎛⎝ ⋅2.98 10
3 ⎞
⎠ psi
Gas pressure subsea charged with hydraulic fluid: ≔P1 Pmax
Minimum operating gas pressure subsea charged 
with hydraulic fluid: ≔P2 Pf
Accumulator usable volume comparison calculation
By Kiryl Kozel
24/04/2015
Page 2 of 2
Gas volume subsea charged with hydraulic fluid 
for surface charged accumulator: ≔V1a =―――
⋅Pca V0
P1
6.43 gal
Gas volume subsea charged with hydraulic fluid 
for subsea charged accumulator: ≔V1b =―――
⋅P0b V0
P1
6.39 gal
Gas volume at minimum operational pressure for 
surface charged accumulator:
≔V2a =―――
⋅P0a V1a
P2
11.2 gal
Gas volume at minimum operational pressure for 
subsea charged accumulator: ≔V2b =―――
⋅P1 V1b
P2
14.9 gal
Usable fluid for accumulators 
charged at surface:
≔Va =−
‖
‖
‖
‖
‖
‖
←s V2a
if >V2a V0
‖
‖
←s V0
s
V1a 4.77 gal
Usable fluid for accumulators 
charged subsea:
≔Vb =−
‖
‖
‖
‖
‖
‖
←s V2b
if >V2b V0
‖
‖
←s V0
s
V1b 8.52 gal
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Appendix D – Accumulators in groups 
An example schematic of how accumulators could be put in groups and allow sequential 
operation. 
 

